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Abstract: In this paper we will analyze the relationship between free market
principles and ethics through an exploration of how too many business
managers often approach the ideas of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman. In
doing so, we aim to provide a thoughtful foundation for future discussions of
how we ought to navigate this intersection. We briefly examine questions
such as: What is the relationship between the “best” economy in terms of
efficiency and the common good for society? Is pursuing one’s individual
economic advantage the same as promoting the general interest? As we
analyze and discuss these questions, specifically in the context of Smith and
Friedman, we also make some alternative normative assertions, grounded in
social welfare, about adopting a broader societal perspective for the purpose
of business.
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Introduction
The latter half of the 20th century brought with it a shift in
political and economic thought—both in the minds of academics, and in
the popular US culture. No longer was the market merely a dynamic
instrument of exchange—a tool which when used properly, could help
industrialized societies rapidly achieve resource allocation and
distribution. Ushered in by Robert Nozick’s (1974) magnum opus,
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the free market would become more than
an instrument, it would transform into the barometer of morality itself.
In recent years, this line of thinking has evolved to become an
increasingly powerful mantra in Western capitalist democracies, and
two titans of free market thought have become flagbearers for an
arguably muddled and sometimes destructive message.
In this paper, we will discuss the impact that the writings of
Adam Smith and Milton Friedman have had on popular beliefs about
the free market, and on conceptions of free market morality. Hovering
around and above the debate between welfare liberalism and laissezfaire capitalism are misunderstood portraits of two great thinkers—
caricatures that have been stretched beyond what was written and
spoken. We will deconstruct the sometimes warped portraits of Smith
and Friedman, and in so doing, we hope to lay the foundations for a
more informed dialogue in both practitioner and academic settings.
Finally, we will discuss the normative implications of a balanced
reading of both thinkers, and how a shift in our economic lens from
strict efficiency to overall effectiveness may lead to a greater wellbeing for individuals and society. In other words, efficient economic
exchange alone may not be the pathway to the most effective market
outcomes. For example, the exchange of “money for product” between
buyers of gas-guzzling SUVs and their manufacturers may produce
satisfied parties on both ends of the transaction but whether this
outcome, with its inherent environmental impacts, is the most
effective exchange that might occur is another question entirely.
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The Popular Conceptions of Adam Smith and
Milton Friedman
Adam Smith is rightly considered one of the founding fathers of
modern economics. His book, The Wealth of Nations, has become a
legendary tome on workings of an efficient economy, and the healthy
relationship between states and markets (Ross 1985). But public
discourse about such matters has become warped as nuanced
concepts such as “market efficiency” and “minimal government
intervention” have been used to denigrate or support a variety of
political and economic positions.
In this essay, we will mainly focus on one of Smith’s enduring
legacies—the metaphor of the invisible hand. The most common
interpretation of Adam Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand is one of
an autonomous, self-regulatory entity that ensures that the market,
when properly functioning via rationally self-interested exchange, will
achieve the most economically efficient results (Mueller 1993). Some
expand this argument further and suggest that the most economically
efficient outcome also produces the most moral result. To understand
how pervasive this interpretation is, consider one popular culture and
convenient description:
“In economics, the invisible hand of the market is a metaphor
used by Adam Smith to describe the self-regulating behavior of
the marketplace” (Wikipedia 2013).
The invisible hand as so conceived suggests that free markets
are a necessary condition for free actors to engage economically in a
productive manner. Unless the free market is respected as a selfregulating entity, efficient exchange between parties will be dampened
and even damaged. At its most robust, the concept of the invisible
hand also substitutes for government regulations and ethical rules of
business. Tariffs, subsidies, antitrust rules, consumer protections, and
more (according to some) are unnecessary since the market itself will
dictate proper and fair play. As the invisible hand ensures the best
results when properly regarded, external regulation is worse than
superfluous; it is downright destructive. Consider a company that
attempts to cheat its customers by selling products it knows to be of
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poor quality. In theory, once word gets out, customers will not buy
said good, economically punishing the company. This force, more than
any regulation, ought to compel companies to offer quality goods and
services. In this manner, the invisible hand also drives markets toward
more moral results. This reading has become a dominant
interpretation in the greater business community (Buchanan 1985).
While there are strong arguments to be made that this is not what
Smith intended, especially given his work in Theory of Moral
Sentiments, we will focus on this “market supremacy” oriented view
initially before expanding our analysis to include a further nuance
of Smith’s thinking.
Milton Friedman was an extremely influential economist and
leader of the Chicago school of economics. While his Nobel Prize was
awarded for his research into monetary history and theory, his famous
New York Times essay, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase Profits,” set an agenda for the relationship between the
market and morality that has only magnified today (Butler 1985). The
New York Times essay popularized the view about social responsibility
that Friedman had previously advocated in his 1962 book, Capitalism
and Freedom, where he wrote:
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundation
of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a
social responsibility other than to make as much money for their
stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive
doctrine. If businessmen do have a social responsibility other
than making maximum profits for their stockholders, how are
they to know what it is? Can self-selected private individuals
decide what the social interest is (Friedman 2002, p. 133)?
Below we will focus on that argument and how it has informed
discussions of business ethics, and corporate social responsibility.
Today, many perceive a tug of war between two dominant theories in
the world of business ethics. This conflict plays out in the classroom,
on social media, and on cable TV news. Stakeholder theories (Freeman
2010) and shareholder theories of corporate responsibility are pitted
against each other in binary battles of greed versus altruism, liberal
versus conservative, free market versus government interventionism.
Some paint a picture of Friedman as an advocate of corporate greed,

Philosophy of Management, Vol 14, No. 3 (November 2015): pg. 179191. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer.

4

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

unrestrained markets, and profit over and above social goods. Others
portray Friedman as a paragon of business freedom, deregulation, the
intrinsic societal good of private profit, and even of capitalism as the
embodiment of morality. While few modern academics endorse such
rigid views, we still encounter them frequently in the political arena,
and such reality matters greatly from a public policy standpoint.
Advocates for minimal market interventions cherry pick pieces of
Wealth of Nations and Capitalism and Freedom to further their world
view. Lost in this thrust is that Friedman not only allows for the law
but expects it to constrain business, plus, he is also aggressively antimonopoly (Friedman 2002, p. 131–132).
Friedman’s New York Times essay unleashed a flurry of
discussion both in academic circles as well as in the business
community. To this day, business ethics professors around the country
dedicate days of class-time to having students read and discuss the
piece. In business symposia, MBA classrooms, and even academic
journal analysis, the Friedman article is often framed as a showcase of
the clash between profits versus ethics by critics and of ethics through
profits by proponents (Jennings 2012).
Support for Friedman’s argument often comes in a particular
flavor that one might find familiar after discussing the modern
narrative surrounding Adam Smith. In arguments repeated in
textbooks and in classrooms, proponents of Friedman’s argument
against CSR rely on an appeal to the distinction between private and
public property. For the typical business (publicly held or not), selfinterested actions in the name of profit maximization, is the most
rational course of action. As long as the business is not intentionally
causing legally demonstrable harm, it should not be restrained in its
economic pursuit. Forcing or even suggesting that business to do
something for the greater social good would not only harm the
business unfairly, but might not even succeed at its intended goal.
CSR contradicts the primary function of a business, which is profit. If a
business’s role in society is to make money for its owners, it seems
logical that by striving to maximize profits, a business is doing the best
thing it can do for the community it resides in. Some extrapolate
beyond this point and suggest that any regulation is a form of
attempting to enforce efficiency-eroding CSR principles, and thus is
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unjustified and harmful. We can recall interpretations of Smith that
also suggest unfettered profit maximization will always generate the
best results for all involved (Gaski 2013).
Criticism both from the public and others in the academic
community has often been harsh, denouncing Friedman’s argument as
morally bankrupt. Sometimes even business executives have
powerfully sounded their doubts. In 1979, Quaker Oats president
Kenneth Mason famously wrote that Friedman’s philosophy was “a
dreary and demeaning view of the role of business and business
leaders in our society. Making a profit is no more the purpose of a
corporate than getting enough to eat is the purpose of life. Getting
enough to eat is a requirement of life; life’s purpose, one would hope,
is somewhat broader and more challenging. Likewise with business
and profit (1979).”
Critics of unconstrained commercial operations, like Mason and
many business ethics faculty members, see business as a powerful
force with social responsibilities. But some critics also minimize, or at
least disregard, the impact that good external oversight (i.e.,
regulation) might have on economic systems and its business dealings.
Good regulation, as we discuss, is left on the sideline by some in favor
of a discussion about what a business ought to do of its own volition.
As we move forward, we will begin to pull apart these
depictions, and suggest (we hope) a richer and more nuanced view of
Smith and Friedman.

Deconstructing the Simplified Portrait of Adam
Smith
As mentioned earlier, in the media, classrooms, and academic
journals, Adam Smith is often cited as a proponent of free trade, and a
critic of government intervention. Unfortunately, while much of this
has some foundations in the truth, it is nevertheless not always clear
what writers mean when they use terms such as “free trade,” and
“government intervention” to extrapolate the thinking of Smith.
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith lays the
foundation for his views about self-interest, and the common good. In
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Moral Sentiments, Smith points out we humans have a strong altruistic
tendency to be other-regarding in our actions.
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing
it…(2002, p. 11)
For Smith, such sympathy helps guide our understanding of the
sentiments of others. We sympathize with another, because we can
understand what others are feeling in a particular situation—a tenet of
Smith’s writings that we will touch on again below. What then do we
make of Smith’s appeal to self-interest in The Wealth of Nations? Does
Smith abandon his views on “other-regarding” in The Wealth of
Nations (1776) in favor of self-interested economic gain? Some have
called this apparent turnabout the “Adam Smith problem” but we have
good reason to think that this is not the case (Wilson 1989).
Throughout his life, Smith continued to revise the Theory of Moral
Sentiments, implying clearly that he did not repudiate it. And he
remains concerned, throughout The Wealth of Nations, with an
overarching justice that an efficient economy can be a part of, but
cannot replace. Pure selfishness tends toward results that actually
harm the free market. Short-sighted selfishness is not the same as
self-interest, and it is actually a threat to a well-functioning society
(Werhane 1989).
To illustrate this key point, we will work through two famous
passages from Smith’s, The Wealth of Nations. First, let us consider
Smith’s oft cited example of the Butcher, Brewer, and Baker.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but
to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities
but of their advantages (2001, p. 15).
In addition to this passage, the Invisible Hand is perhaps the
single most famous concept credited to Smith. It is presented to us,
much as the butcher, brewer, and baker passage, as Smith
hammering home the value and benefits of an unrestricted free
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market. The message to the uninitiated is clear—a good economy
needs no oversight, no regulation, and no interference. The market
regulates itself with an invisible hand, Smith seems to be telling us,
but is that really the case? Here’s the original quotation about the
motivation of producers:
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry,
he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry
in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value,
he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society
that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much
good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It
is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants,
and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from
it (2001, p. 484–485).
If Smith is advocating, in no uncertain terms, that external
regulation is our enemy, then he seems to be contradicting himself not
three paragraphs later when he writes, “if a foreign country can supply
us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better
buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry
(Smith 2001, p. 487).” Rather than contradicting himself so blatantly
(see quote below), we think it is more likely that Smith is making a
more nuanced argument than might be clear at first blush. We must
take into account the mercantilist times Smith lived in; regularly,
governments tried to manipulate tariffs, taxes, and subsidies to best
each other. Conversely, Smith was very aware that the short term
interests of businesses were not always naturally aligned with the
public interest as seen by government.
The interest of the dealers…is always in some respects different
from and even opposite to that of the public.... The proposal of
any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this
order ought always be listened to with great precaution, and
ought never to be adopted till after having been long and
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with
the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men
whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public,
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who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress
the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions
both deceived and oppressed it (Smith 2001, p. 292).
In discussing regulations, Smith is focused on these tendencies
toward manipulations. When he takes aim at efforts to guide
economies, Smith is making an argument against protectionism. His
critique is aimed at the inefficiencies and harm caused by tariffs,
taxes, and subsidies, not necessarily all regulation.
The notion of the invisible hand has become so poorly
understood by modern audiences, that it often comes as shock to
many that Smith wrote about beneficial regulations at all. William D.
Grampp emphasis this point—Smith’s had no theory of The Invisible
Hand; he only considered the metaphor of the invisible hand with
regard to the movement of capital over national borders. Grampp
considers the scope of the original metaphor, by stating, “the invisible
hand guides a merchant only when circumstances induce him to keep
his capital at home (2000, p. 447).”
Later Grampp notes, [there are] 35 or 40 measures of
government intervention of which Smith approved, or which he
advocated…The most numerous have to do with helping buyers,
sellers, and people in need of help of one kind or another (2000, p.
460).
Smith does not consider the invisible hand to be an impartial
overlord of economic activity, ensuring moral outcomes. He seems to
implicitly recognize what today’s economists call “externalities”—i.e.,
the costs that private actions impose on others, some unintended,
some foreseen, but ones that might be considered for rectification.
One analyst of Smith even writes: “Smith is often thought of as being
indifferent, even hostile, to the poor. On the contrary, he was not
opposed, as a matter of principle, to redistributing income: He wanted
to tax horse carriages so that “the indolence and vanity of the rich is
made to contribute in a very easy manner to relief of the poor (Nasar
1994).”
That said, a balanced reading of Smith both suggests and
explicitly points to “laws of justice” that must not be violated in order
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to ensure the ability of agents to pursue their interests. Laws that
apply to economic actors equally, in order to ensure a more level
playing field, are acceptable. Smith’s critique of government oversight
is primarily aimed at rules and regulations that give some competitors
an advantage or disadvantage. The invisible hand is not
the arbitrator; we still need some form of external governance for
that. The invisible hand, which is only mentioned four times
throughout Wealth of Nations, is at most a descriptive mechanism;
one that shows how the pursuit of economic self-interest can
commonly yield unintended positive outcomes beyond the scope of the
individual’s self-interested decision.
And when discussing banking, Smith also acknowledges that
government regulation can be justified due to the consequences to the
public. This is because, the risk of failure of certain elements is of such
high consequence that restrictions on the completely free dealings of
the banks are worth the loss of some economic liberty. By restricting
the most egregious endangerments, the whole of society is made
better off. When successful, regulation does not, as is often argued
today, generate inefficiency; Smith argues that it can help ensure
better dealings by recognizing negative and harmful tendencies within
an industry. At their best, good regulations can actually promote
greater freedom. The free market depends on free
actors, not the other way around.

Deconstructing the Simplified Portrait of Milton
Friedman
Milton Friedman lays out his thinking on managerial
responsibilities quite succinctly when he writes,
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate
executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has
direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to
conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which
generally will be to make as much money as possible while
conforming to their basic rules of the society, both those
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. Of
course, in some cases his employers may have a different
objective. A group of persons might establish a corporation for
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an eleemosynary purpose—for example, a hospital or a school.
The manager of such a corporation will not have money profit as
his objectives but the rendering of certain services.
In either case, the key point is that, in his capacity as a
corporate executive [emphasis added], the manager is the
agent of the individuals who own the corporation or establish
the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to
them (1970).
At first blush, this might seem callous and dismissive toward
notion that corporations are also citizen-members of communities.
From the standpoint of stakeholder theories, our intuitions suggest
that as members of communities, business, like the individual folks
within those communities, have definable moral responsibilities to the
other members of those communities. From the standpoint of
shareholder theories, Friedman seems to be promoting a view that
‘business does what business does’ apart from the goings on of the
rest of society, and that the best thing a business can do for society is
make money—therefore, its ability to earn profits ought to be
unimpeded.
Contrary to this interpretation, Friedman explicitly advocates for
the role of governments and other institutions as impeders of business
in this way. Friedman writes that, “The role of government just
considered is to do something that the market cannot do for itself,
namely, to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game
(2002, p. 27).” Free markets, aren’t, as the dominant rhetoric
suggests, unchained from regulation and rules. Free markets, for
Friedman, are beholden to proper regulations and rules. Drawing on
Adam Smith no less, Friedman argues,
It is the responsibility of the rest of us to establish a framework
of law such that an individual in pursuing his own interests is, to
quote Adam Smith again, ‘led by an invisible hand to promote
an end which was no part of his intention (2002, p. 133).’
Advocates of traditional formulations of corporate social
responsibility can think about this passage with a thought exercise.
Suppose a factory is the source of significant pollutants that are
damaging a river. Currently, there are no local or federal regulations
that prohibit this, though there is good evidence that the pollutants
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are having a detrimental effect on the surrounding community. The
factory has the ability to dramatically reduce emissions, but at great
financial cost. Friedman argues that in this circumstance, the factory
management ought to first, consider the goal of the owners. If the
owners want to prioritize environmental concerns, so be it. That’s
certainly the prerogative of the owners, for Friedman. But if the
owners want to prioritize profit however, it is the managers’
responsibility to do that. In this scenario, some advocates of CSR
might argue that management must consider all of the stakeholders
before making a decision. As the community around the river is made
up of stakeholders, their concerns must be factored into business
decisions. This however, pushes well beyond the basic structure of the
business. Friedman’s point is that, businesses do not—and should
not—make the rules of the game; it’s beyond their scope. Businesses
are institutions that make money via service provision; that is their
primary function. If we want a clean river, we (the people) need to
make the rules such. Do we truly want the manager of the factory
determining what the rules of the game ought to be? What about
scenario’s where the good or right thing is not as seemingly obvious?
For example, suppose it is known by the managers that a very tiny
amount of a lethal chemical is leaking into the water? We end up in
the situation where different managers make very different decisions
in the name of corporate social responsibility. Friedman wants
managers to defer ethical judgments to the corporate charter of their
organizations, or effective oversight institutions—the government.
The upshot here is that Friedman is not simply prioritizing
business over ethics; he’s advocating for a decoupling of business and
ethics insofar as we expect business managers to create society’s
ethical frameworks. Friedman’s point is that not only is this bad
business, but it’s also bad ethics. If we want businesses to adhere to
particular ethical principles, we must codify those rules. If we want to
achieve particular society goals, such as taking care of those that are
worse off, we must engage or even create other institutions that are
better served at meeting those goals. In this way, Friedman is not
denying the ethical endgame of those who prioritize stakeholders. We
believe a fair-minded reading of Friedman does not result in a tradeoff between stakeholder theory and shareholder primacy. Friedman’s
perspective is not that of the heartless corporatist, but that of a
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functional realist, depicting which institutions ought to be focused on
what particular societal goals and goods. Profit motivated business, for
all of its far-reaching impact, still operates in a narrow way. According
to the Friedman view, tasking it with things beyond its scope is not
only unfair to the business, but detrimental to society. If we want
money out of politics, codify that; if we want institutions that
redistribute income from the top brackets to lower ones, codify that as
well. Friedman understood that the free market is not the embodiment
of delivered morality, but instead, it is a powerful instrument of
resource allocation. The market is but one societal instrument among
many that, when regarded and constrained properly, can generate
good moral outcomes. Here is the bottom line: For Friedman, ethics
exists in legal consensus, and ethical forces exist outside the
agent, e.g., the manager who is only tasked with doing her job. The
danger is that without strong countervailing institutions, such as the
prudent regulations of government, the protocol of Friedman can be
detrimental to society. It makes little sense to talk about “business
ethics” from Friedman’s standpoint. The market is defined in fairly
narrow terms, and there is little regard for society’s best interests.
This compartmentalized position stands in stark contrast with the more
altruistic and society focused view of Smith, at least when Smith is
seen in the context of his Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Prioritizing Effectiveness over Strict Efficiency
To summarize what has been argued thus far:
1. A careful reading of both Adam Smith and Milton Friedman does
not reveal the mania for unconstrained free markets that
ideologue caricatures of those two writers often claim.
2. Adam’s Smith’s invisible hand, a metaphoric ideal in the main,
does not pre-empt a role for personal ethics or targeted
government intervention.
1. Milton Friedman’s profit focused management style for agentmanagers, while clearly skeptical of managers exercising their
individual ethical values, is compatible with stakeholder
empowering strategies as long as those values are embedded in
the law or the operational charter of that corporation.
One abiding legacy of both Smith and Friedman is that they
recognized the efficiency of free market allocations and the importance
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of allowing managers to focus on their primary function of economic
provisioning. However, they both suggest that other market outcomes
beyond pure efficiency matter to the society and that to achieve such
effectiveness, both markets and business actions sometimes needed to
be externally constrained. Put another way, economic efficiency is
mainly directed at transactional resource allocation; market
effectiveness takes pro-social and pro-environmental outcomes into
account.
While this is primarily an analytical essay on the doctrinal
implications of carefully reading Smith and Friedman, we offer some
concluding normative thoughts on the nature of constraining
institutions and their purposes. That is, we briefly address what sort of
constraints larger societal institutions might provide upon managerial
actions and market machinations. And, we preview what factors should
be kept in mind if the efficiency of free markets is ever to be
constrained for societal effectiveness.
Drawing partly on the recent writings of (one of) the authors, a
few threads of the needed debate are proffered below. The discussion
is not meant to be comprehensive by any measure, but rather to
suggest that MBA classroom discussions and op/ed essays should
delve deeper than the superficial “free markets, minimum regulation
and an eye to profit are all that’s needed” mantra.
How deterministic are the invisible hand metaphor of Smith and
the “discount corporate social responsibility” views of Friedman
in shaping contemporary business views?
The short answer here is that no organization is required to
embody in its operational decision-making the simple minded views of
Adam Smith and Milton Friedman that we critique above. There are
many case studies of enlightened business firms that have embraced
corporate social responsibility; that regard proactive ethics as
instrumental to good business; that work in partnership with local,
state or federal government to clarify, demarcate and secure
stakeholder fairness. On the other hand, it is also difficult to watch a
financial news TV program or read the editorial page of a business
periodical without someone proposing that if only markets were
deregulated and compliance costs were eliminated, profits would soar
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and whatever “problem” was at focus would be instantly solved. Too
often, the source authority for such views, if given, is attributed to a
long standing wisdom proposed by Adam Smith or Milton Friedman,
unfortunately misunderstood. Typically, this is followed up with public
policy recommendations to remove or delimit regulation of business
and/or to measure “success” by purely what the market decides. Thus,
the complex issue that we address in this essay is stronger and more
enduring than the proverbial straw man.
What are the elements of business performance that go beyond
self-interest and profitability in assessing business
effectiveness?
Our above discussion of Smith and Friedman begs the question,
‘Why does society care about a level of business impact that goes
beyond mere economic efficiency?’ On one level, it is tempting to glibly
ask: “Does everyone remember the copious financial shenanigans
leading to the global recession of 2007–08?” But the better answer lies
in the fundamental social contract that exists between businesses and
society (Laczniak and Murphy 2014). Within a capitalistic system,
businesses play a major role in providing the goods and services that
all communities require to flourish and grow. In exchange for investing
capital, fostering innovation and bearing risk, the rewards of profit
rightly accrue to participating business organizations. However, the
license to operate as the “provisionary” of needed products and
services comes from society. For example, according to the U.S.
Constitution (Article 1, Section 8), the federal government
(representing society) reserves the right to regulate commerce in the
public interest. Similar institutional constraints upon business activity
are extant in almost all developed economies. In this macro context,
society is understandably concerned with social outcomes other than
the profits to which business aspires. Often, even as local businesses
prosper, the mix of goods and services being provided by
unconstrained markets and unregulated operations is not optimally
beneficial to the broader society. For instance, primary to this inquiry
might be questions such as: Are the type of goods required by the
public being provided in sufficient quantity and at a fair price? Does
distribution and marketing cost too much? Is business providing as
much to the host community (i.e., fair taxes being paid) as it receives
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from it? Are the economic successes of a publically supported business
climate being shared equitably with the host community?
Along with the policy implications of such questions, society
does not wish to bear undue costs from the side-effects of business
endeavors (e.g., environmental pollution, exploitation of workers,
predatory rent seeking). Minimally, this means ala Friedman, that
business is expected to conform to the existing law. Proactively, the
social contract would imply that Business [writ large] be evaluated on
implicit social dimensions such as effective job creation, living wage
rates, whether investments have reasonable long-run sustainability,
the absence of stakeholder exploitation and, if companies pay their fair
share of taxes to support the public infrastructure from which they
directly benefit. Thus, the notion that financial outcomes for individual
firms should be “maximized” clearly can be at odds with the principle
of the common good as perceived by society.
What societal institutions provide the oversight to constrain
certain market workings and the operations of business to
enhance societal effectiveness?
In order that the social welfare of all stakeholders are protected
from the sometimes negative side-effects of business operations,
various institutional entities need to guarantee the power structure
required by society to receive what is their due, i.e., a just
marketplace that balances the right of buyers and sellers. Put
differently, it is institutions and their associated oversight
arrangements that provide the power to assure fairness in business
operations when it does not naturally occur (Santos et al. 2014). The
entities that do this—the essential instruments of transformative
justice—include primarily the government, but also industry
associations, professional bodies (e.g., the ABA), and corporate
cultures, especially when driven social purposes embedded in their
charters. As the role of government has been primary in our
discussions of Smith and Friedman, our brief commentary here centers
on the government regulation.
One way that the government can ensure that the rights of all
stakeholders are protected is by enacting legislation and enforcing
existing regulation aimed at ensuring that a firm’s stakeholders are not
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exploited by corporations in their quest for efficiency. Our above
discussion of both Smith and Friedman seems to dutifully allow for
such adjustments. For instance, many states in the U.S. have passed
legislation that caps the interest rates that lenders can charge on
various financial transactions, regardless of what supply and demand
might dictate. In a similar vein, the Federal Reserve Board approved
rules in 2008 that protect credit card users from assorted unfair
practices of credit card companies. In addition to legislation that acts
as a protective shield against abusive and exploitive practices of
stakeholders, the government also can implement various probusiness policy measures such as tax-breaks and subsidies that
encourage greater investment in certain economic sectors that are not
well served. For example, incentives might be utilized to attract
retailers of healthy food to economically challenged city markets.
Obvious impediments to utilizing government as the successful
guarantor of the power necessary to achieve transformative justice for
all of society’s stakeholders are its historic bureaucratic inefficiencies
and/or its corruptions—situations all too common in the public sector,
and a fact recognized by Adam Smith back in 1776 (Wilson 1989).
What considerations do unfettered markets routinely ignore?
Economics has a “stylized response” for making market
adjustments. Consistent with the ideologue view of Smith’s ‘invisible
hand” metaphor outlined above, markets, if left “free”, should be selfadjusting. Consistent with Friedman’s disposition to profit
maximization by business without open-ended social concerns,
economic efficiency will win the day. But economic efficiency is not the
same thing as effectiveness for the society in terms of its economic
needs, a point we have argued that both Smith and Friedman in fact
realized, despite the sometimes simplification of their positions by
others. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a key measure of economic
contribution, is not the same thing a “societal wellness” anymore than
the absence of disease is a complete measure of a person’s good
health. For example, GDP grows when more persons are incarcerated
in prison, or when local disaster clean-ups occur or when ‘cheap’
handguns are manufactured. But are such expenditures a measure of
a community growing healthier? Most folks would say “not” and argue
instead that their common good is something far more complex.
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To understand business and market contributions from a social
contract standpoint, the triple bottom line of outcomes—financials,
positive social impact and ecological sustainability should probably be
measured—i.e., profit, people, planet (Bhattacharya and Korschun
2008). Understanding such desired societal outcomes from business
activity in multiple markets seems a strong first step in coming to
grips with the ultimate purpose of economic systems.
The rationale for wanting “healthy” markets that are efficient
and effective in their operations is to create and promote economic
wealth consistent with society’s common good (Laczniak and Lusch
2016). We define the elusive “common good” as including all the
necessary steps to create and maintain markets which have the
capabilities to assure a flourishing community of stakeholders. The
basic logic chain, in summary, is as follows: Societies require healthy
markets to optimally develop. There are defensible characteristics that
comprise markets that can be designated as “healthy. The protection
of certain basic rights for all stakeholders contributes to such markets,
which again are essentially instrumental because they allow for
exchange mechanisms that serve the greater “good” of society by
contributing to both economic rewards for business and positive social
outcomes for society. Long term economic wealth (shared profits) is
the reward for doing these tasks well. Added to this is the idea that
most business executives, consistent with the motivations behind
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, should want to help steward a
fairness that flows from the brotherhood of all men and an inherent
sympathy to that reality.
Further we suggest that the implicit social contract between
business and society includes:
1. Promoting human flourishing for the common good. The full
measure of an economy is found in more than its GDP but in
how it enhances the quality of life for all its participants and its
sustainability for the society (e.g., the availability of an
assortment of jobs that pay a living wage; protection of the
physical environment for future generations; how an affluent
economy treats is poorest citizens).
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2. In a market economy the common good involves helping to
create healthy markets that are characterized by: (a) a greater
sensitivity to differences in consumers’ needs, wants and
preferences, (b) higher quality goods and services, (c) greater
innovativeness, (d) higher productivity, and (e) greater
economic growth. This requires looking at the healthiness of the
business system not merely from the financial perspective of
individual players but also from its social/environmental (i.e.,
macro) dimensions and their interactions. This is a lesson often
lost in an ideological reading of Friedman or a too narrow
reading of Smith.
3. In a market economy the common good cannot be fully
achieved through endogenous market processes but requires
the development and fostering of the eight fundamental rights
of market exchange that often must be guaranteed by
government regulation: (a) the right to safety, (b) the right to
be informed, (c) the right to choose, and the (d) the right to be
heard. Other rights that are often needed for a market economy
to operate in a healthy manner are: (e) private property
protections, (f) relatively unconstrained personal freedom, (g)
freedom from coercion, and (h) fairness oversight.
These rights and considerations, which protect and constrain
business actions, are hopefully guaranteed by the laws according to
which Friedman advocated individual business must abide. In addition,
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is not alone sufficient for healthy
markets; free enterprise should more correctly be understood as
constrained enterprise formulated for a common purpose—i.e., the
provision of needed resources to the community via a financial
incentive system aided by self-interested businesses. And neither is
Friedman’s “profit maximization” a sufficient condition for society’s
economic health since the rights of healthy markets outlined above will
often not occur without governmental protections.

Conclusion
We have argued for a change in how we portray the free market
“at its best.” We think the prevailing perceptions of an unfettered,
unregulated market as being best as been exacerbated by a
misreading of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman. Rather than simply
focusing on how well the economic game can be played, we suggest
that a move from “economic efficiency” to “market effectiveness”
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would better reflect a focus on the societal common good. The market
is a tool to generate, proliferate, and manage the resources we need
to flourish as a society. Even allowing that the free market can
efficiently generate a multitude of goods, market success alone is not
a desirable end goal. Thoughtful policy-making with an eye toward the
common good can create an environment where responsible business
practices are not only economically efficient, but effectively advance
society’s higher interests.
In this paper we have attempted to, first and foremost, help set
the table for rational, reasoned discussion when it comes to the
intersection of economic policy and ethics as perceived by Adam Smith
and Milton Friedman. We looked at only a sliver of what Smith and
Friedman had to say about economic efficiency, albeit some of their
most salient and frequently quoted points—the invisible hand
metaphor and the call for management to be dominantly focused on
profit maximization. Certainly, there is much to be discussed in this
sphere, and we have entered the fray with certain assumptions—
namely the priority of the common good when it comes to good policymaking aiding societal welfare. Even so, we cannot begin to have a
fruitful discussion about “good” economies if we do not take a serious
look at the foundations behind our thoughts. The deserved legacies
Adam Smith and Milton Friedman are a vital part of that foundation,
and it is imperative that we be able to read, discuss, and apply their
thoughts and ideas in good faith. Just as importantly, we hope that
managers and policy makers will not be bound by dogma. Smith and
Friedman are not above reproach, and though we have attempted a
spirited dissection of their ideas in a balanced fashion, we cannot be
afraid to move beyond them. There is much work still to be done.
Particular policy recommendations are well beyond the scope of this
paper, but we hope to have helped move the discussion forward by
laying a general foundation for what constitutes market effectiveness
for the common good and how that may differ from economic
efficiency.
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